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Representation by Counsel or Access to 
Defense Resources: Utah’s Single 
Source Approach to Indigent Defense 
John P. Gross* 
Abstract 
The State of Utah has a unique way of providing 
representation in criminal cases to defendants who are too poor to 
hire an attorney. In Utah, there is no statewide funding or 
supervision of indigent defense. Each county, city, or town is 
responsible for creating and funding their own indigent defense 
delivery system. Utah is one of only two states in the United 
States—Pennsylvania is the other—that fails to provide state 
funding or oversight of indigent defense. But what makes Utah 
truly unique is the way in which counties and municipalities are 
required to structure their indigent defense delivery systems. 
Utah’s Indigent Defense Act (IDA) mandates a single-source 
approach to the provision of indigent defense: indigent defendants 
who require additional “defense resources” to adequately prepare 
for trial, such as investigators or expert witnesses, must agree to 
be represented by the county or municipality’s “defense service 
provider.” A defendant who elects to retain private counsel is not 
entitled to additional funds from the county or municipality for 
any additional “defense resources.”   
This “single-source approach” does not affect those defendants 
who are too poor to hire an attorney or those defendants wealthy 
enough to both retain counsel and pay the cost of whatever 
additional defense resources are necessary to adequately prepare 
for trial. But for defendants who are marginally indigent, who 
have the financial resources to retain counsel but are unable to 
afford additional “defense resources,” the single-source approach 
forces them to waive either their Sixth Amendment right to 
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counsel of choice or their Fourteenth Amendment right to “the 
basic tools of an adequate defense.” 
Defendants have the right to select an attorney who will be the 
architect of their defense, but they also have the right to “the raw 
materials integral to the building of an effective defense.” Utah’s 
single-source approach to indigent defense ignores the fact that 
these rights are two separate and distinct constitutional rights 
and conditions a defendant’s access to additional resources on a 
waiver of their right to counsel of their own choice. Now that the 
Supreme Court of Utah has decided that the IDA’s single-source 
approach is constitutional, marginally indigent defendants in 
Utah who wish to retain counsel, but also need additional defense 
resources to adequately prepare for trial, have no other option 
than to appeal to the Federal Courts. Whatever decision is 
ultimately reached by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, it is abundantly clear that the IDA’s single-source 
approach to indigent defense is yet another legislative effort to 
avoid adequately funding an indigent defense system that would 
seem to have “no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion 
of constitutional rights.” 
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I. Introduction 
The State of Utah has a unique way of providing 
representation in criminal cases to defendants who are too poor to 
hire an attorney. In Utah, there is no statewide funding or 
supervision of indigent defense. Each county, city, or town is 
responsible for creating and funding its own indigent defense 
delivery system. Utah is one of only two states in the United 
States—Pennsylvania is the other—that fails to provide state 
funding or oversight of indigent defense.1 But what makes Utah 
truly unique is the way in which counties and municipalities are 
required to structure their indigent defense delivery systems. 
Utah’s Indigent Defense Act (IDA) mandates a single-source 
approach to the provision of indigent defense:2 indigent 
defendants who require additional “defense resources” to 
adequately prepare for trial, such as investigators or expert 
witnesses, must agree to be represented by the county or 
municipality’s “defense service provider.”3 A defendant who elects 
                                            
 1. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF UTAH, FAILING GIDEON: UTAH’S FLAWED 
COUNTY-BY-COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, 4 (2011) [hereinafter FAILING 
GIDEON], http://www.acluutah.org/images/Failing_Gideon.pdf; see also Indigent 
Defense Systems, Utah, SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR., 
http://sixthamendment.org/the-right-to-counsel/state-indigent-defense-
systems/utah/ (last visited June 8, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).   
 2. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-303 (LexisNexis 1992). 
 3. Id. § 77-32-303(2); see also State v. Steinly, No. 20120715, 2015 WL 
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to retain private counsel is not entitled to additional funds from 
the county or municipality for any additional “defense resources.” 
This “single-source approach” does not affect those defendants 
who are too poor to hire an attorney or those defendants wealthy 
enough to both retain counsel and pay the cost of whatever 
additional defense resources are necessary to adequately prepare 
for trial. But marginally indigent defendants who have the 
financial resources to retain counsel, but are unable to afford 
additional “defense resources,” are forced by the single-source 
approach to waive either their Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
of choice or their Fourteenth Amendment right to “the basic tools 
of an adequate defense.” 
II. Utah’s Indigent Defense Act and Access to Additional 
Defense Resources 
The United States Supreme Court has held that defendants 
who are “too poor to hire a lawyer” are entitled to counsel4 and 
that “a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State 
proceeds against an indigent defendant without making certain 
that he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of 
an effective defense.”5 Utah’s IDA recognizes the state’s dual 
obligation to provide counsel and the raw materials integral to 
the building of an effective defense. Pursuant to the IDA, 
“indigency” in Utah means that a person “does not have sufficient 
income, assets, credit, or other means to provide for the payment 
of legal counsel and all other necessary expenses of 
representation without depriving that person or the family of that 
person of food, shelter, clothing or other necessities.”6 One 
question, however, that has consistently arisen when interpreting 
the IDA is whether defendants who are able to retain counsel are 
also entitled to “additional defense resources” if they can 
demonstrate that they are indigent.  
                                                                                                     
337633, ¶ 23 (Utah Jan. 27, 2015); State v. Earl, No. 20120991, 2015 WL 
337554, ¶ 25 (Utah Jan. 27, 2015) (describing Utah’s “single source approach to 
indigent defense resources”).  
 4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 5. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985). 
 6. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-202(3)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2015). 
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The Supreme Court of Utah first addressed this issue fifteen 
years ago in State v. Burns.7 In Burns, the defendant was charged 
with the murder of her six-month-old son by starvation and 
dehydration. The defendant claimed that her child, who suffered 
from Down Syndrome, congenital heart disease, and chronic 
pulmonary disease, died as a result of these medical conditions. 
The defendant’s father paid for her bond as well as counsel to 
represent her, but was unable to afford the cost of a medical 
expert—something that defense counsel felt necessary to provide 
effective representation. As a result, defense counsel moved for 
the appointment of a state-funded expert witness. At that time, 
the IDA required that each county, city, and town “provide 
counsel for every indigent person who faces the substantial 
probability of the deprivation of his liberty”8 and “provide the 
investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete 
defense.”9 The trial court held that to have access to funds for 
expert assistance, an indigent defense provider, not private 
counsel, must represent defendants.  
The Supreme Court of Utah found that “the only 
requirements for receiving public assistance for expert witnesses 
are proof of necessity and establishment of indigence.”10 The court 
explained that “[n]umerous other states with comparable statutes 
have held similarly.”11 The court also noted that “[w]hile who is 
paying for a defendant’s attorney may be a factor in the 
determination of indigency, it is not the determinative factor.”12 
In reversing the defendant’s conviction, the court concluded that 
the trial court had “erroneously insisted on packaging indigent 
assistance” with representation by a defense service provider.13 
The year following the Supreme Court of Utah’s holding in 
Burns, the IDA was amended. The amended version of the IDA 
required legal counsel be assigned “to represent each indigent 
                                            
 7. 4 P.3d 795 (2000). 
 8. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-1(1) (LexisNexis 1990). 
 9. Id. § 77-32-1(3). 
 10. Burns, 4 P.3d at 801. 
 11. Id. at 803 n.6. 
 12. Id. at 802. 
 13. Id. 
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and . . . provide the legal defense services necessary for an 
effective defense.”14 In State v. Parduhn15 the Supreme Court of 
Utah addressed whether the amended IDA had effectively 
overruled Burns. Once again, relying on the plain language of the 
statute, the court held that the IDA requires local governments to 
provide an indigent defendant with funding for necessary defense 
resources even when private counsel represents the indigent 
defendant.  
The court’s opinion in Parduhn addressed three cases that 
involved nearly identical facts and legal issues. Each of the three 
defendants involved had been deemed indigent by the district 
court at the time of their initial appearance, and the Salt Lake 
Legal Defenders Association had been assigned to represent 
them. Despite being found indigent, they were able to retain 
private counsel. But in doing so, the defendants exhausted their 
limited financial resources. This exhaustion resulted in a request 
for additional funds from the trial court to secure the services of 
investigators and other expert witnesses who were considered 
necessary for an effective defense. The court held that the IDA 
required local governments to provide an indigent defendant with 
funding for necessary defense resources, even when private 
counsel represented that defendant. The court found that despite 
the amendments to the IDA, the plain language of the statute 
still made a distinction between legal counsel and “defense 
resources.”16  
Most recently, in 2012, the Utah legislature responded to the 
court’s ruling in Pardhun by once again amending the IDA. The 
IDA’s current version explicitly states that if a county or 
municipality has established an indigent defense provider, then 
“the county or municipality may not provide defense resources for 
a defendant who has retained private counsel.”17 It seems clear 
that the “single-source approach” required by the IDA is designed 
as a cost-control measure for counties and municipalities that 
                                            
 14. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-302(1) (LexisNexis 2008). 
 15. 283 P.3d 488 (Utah 2011). 
 16. Id. at 499 (“We first hold that out conclusion in Burns—that local 
governments are statutorily required to provide an indigent defendant with 
funding for a necessary defense resource, even when the defendant is 
represented by private counsel—remains good law.”). 
 17. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-303(2) (LexisNexis 2012). 
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enter into flat-fee contracts with an indigent defense provider. 
Counties will no longer have to pay any additional expenses 
toward defense resources for defendants who retain private 
counsel. Once a county enters into an exclusive contract with an 
indigent defense provider, then it will know with absolute 
certainty how much money it will spend on indigent defense. 
Considering the rising costs of providing indigent defense, as well 
as the uncertainty associated with those costs, it is not surprising 
that the legislature has adopted the single-source approach.18  
III. Recent Developments: State v. Earl19 and State v. Steinly20 
The Supreme Court of Utah was recently called upon to 
decide whether the “single-source approach” to providing indigent 
defense required by the 2012 amendments to the IDA was 
constitutional. In State v. Earl and State v. Steinly, both decided 
in January 2015, the court concluded that “[a] defendant who 
opts out of public representation has also opted out of public 
defense resources, and nothing in the Constitution requires a 
different result.”21    
The defendant in Steinly claimed that the “single-source 
approach” violated “his constitutional right to counsel of his 
choice” because it denied to him “access to necessary defense 
                                            
 18. See Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 484 (2007)  
 
Although a lack of data precludes precise calculations of the increase 
in total number of cases assigned to indigent defense counsel, it 
appears by a conservative estimate that the number of cases more 
than doubled—and may have even tripled—between the early 1980s 
and the beginning of this century. 
 
See also Jacqueline McMurtie, Unconscionable Contracting for Indigent Defense: 
Using Contract Theory to Invalidate Conflict of Interest Clauses in Fixed-Fee 
Contracts, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 773, 786 (2006) (noting that “the increase in 
the use of the contract system is primarily based upon an attempt by funding 
authorities to reduce costs in the face of increased prosecutions”).  
 19. No. 20120991, 2015 WL 337554 (Utah Jan. 27, 2015).  
 20. No. 20120715, 2015 WL 337633 (Utah Jan. 27, 2015). 
 21. Id. ¶ 22; Earl, 2015 WL 337554, ¶ 24. 
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resources.”22 Similarly, the defendant in Earl claimed that she 
had a right to “the resources necessary to prepare and present a 
complete and effective defense,” which cannot be conditioned on 
representation by an indigent defense service provider.23 In both 
cases, the Supreme Court of Utah upheld the constitutionality of 
the IDA, reasoning that there was not a constitutional right to 
what the court characterized as “unbundled legal services.”24 The 
court found no problem with the legislative decision “to couple the 
availability of defense resources with the retention of 
government-funded counsel.”25  
A. The Right to Counsel and the Right to Defense Resources 
are Separate and Distinct Constitutional Rights 
The Supreme Court of Utah begins its analysis of the 
constitutional issues raised by the defendants in Earl and Steinly 
by claiming that “[t]he constitutional right to counsel 
encompasses the prerogative of choosing counsel of one’s choice 
and of receiving resources necessary to an adequate defense”26 
and cites to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ake v. 
Oklahoma27 in support of that claim. What the Supreme Court of 
Utah overlooks is that the holding in Ake was based on the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. While the appellant in Ake raised 
claims regarding a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, the United States Supreme Court made it clear that its 
holding was based on the defendant’s due process rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment and not on his right to counsel under 
the Sixth Amendment: “Because we conclude that the Due 
Process Clause guaranteed to Ake the assistance he requested 
and was denied, we have no occasion to consider the applicability 
                                            
 22. Steinly, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 18. 
 23. Earl, 2015 WL 337554, ¶ 20. 
 24. Steinly, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 21; Earl, 2015 WL 337554, ¶ 23. 
 25. State v. Earl, No. 20120991, 2015 WL 337554, ¶ 22 (Utah Jan. 27, 
2015); State v. Steinly, No. 20120715, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 20 (Utah Jan. 27, 
2015). 
 26. Steinly, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 19; Earl, 2015 WL 337554, ¶ 21. 
 27. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
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of the Equal Protection Clause, or the Sixth Amendment, in this 
context.”28 This misreading of Ake resulted in the Supreme Court 
of Utah proceeding under the assumption that the right to 
counsel of one’s choice and the right to the resources necessary 
for an adequate defense are “bundled” together in the Sixth 
Amendment.  
While the Sixth Amendment guarantees indigent defendants 
the right to counsel,29 the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
and Equal Protection clauses require that indigent defendants 
have “an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly 
within the adversary system.”30 The Supreme Court has viewed 
discrimination against indigent defendants as a violation of the 
Equal Protection clause, the Due Process clause, or both. For 
example, in Griffin v. Illinois,31 the denial of a transcript to an 
indigent defendant on appeal was held to be both a violation of 
the Equal Protection clause because it was a form of 
discrimination based on wealth and of the Equal Protection 
clause because appellate review played an integral part in the 
determination of guilt or innocence.32 In Ake, the Court made it 
clear that an indigent defendant should have “a fair opportunity 
to present his defense” based on the belief “that justice cannot be 
equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is 
denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial 
proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.”33    
The Supreme Court of Utah next cites United States v. 
MacCollom34 for the proposition that the right to counsel of one’s 
choice and the right to receive resources to mount an adequate 
defense “are qualified ones.”35 Those two rights are indeed 
qualified, but the decision in MacCollom deals with the denial of 
a transcript to an indigent defendant who was making a 
                                            
 28. Id. at 87 n.13. 
 29. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963). 
 30. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974). 
 31. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).  
 32. Id. at 18. 
 33. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985). 
 34. 426 U.S. 317 (1976). 
 35. State v. Steinly, No. 20120715, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 19 (Utah Jan. 27, 
2015); State v. Earl, No. 20120991, WL 337554, ¶ 21 (Utah Jan. 27, 2015). 
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collateral attack on his state conviction in federal court. 
MacCollom does not address a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel of choice at trial in any way. Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court of Utah comes to the conclusion that “[w]hen a 
defendant elects an avenue that steers away from the public 
representation provided by the government, he [or] she has 
received the private counsel of his [or] her choice and has no 
constitutional right to defense resources from a secondary source 
backed by government funding.”36  
The Supreme Court of Utah then cites Wheat v. United 
States37 for the proposition that the “right to choose one’s own 
counsel is circumscribed in several important respects.”38 Yet 
none of the factors that the United States Supreme Court 
identified in Wheat as justifications for limiting a defendant’s 
choice of counsel are present in Earl or Steinly.39 The defendants 
in Earl and Steinly had counsel that were members of the bar, 
had been retained, were willing to represent them, and had no 
conflicts of interest that would affect their ability to represent 
them. 
B. Choosing Between Constitutional Rights 
The Utah Supreme Court next points out that the United 
States Supreme Court has not “prescribed a single orthodoxy for 
the provision of the defense resources required by the Sixth 
Amendment.”40 They then cite Ake for the proposition that “the 
decision on how to implement this constitutional guarantee” has 
                                            
 36. Steinly, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 19; Earl, WL 337554, ¶ 21. 
 37. 486 U.S. 153 (1988). 
 38. Steinly, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 20; Earl, WL 337554, ¶ 22. 
 39. In Wheat, the United States Supreme Court mentions four instances 
where the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is circumscribed: 1) when the 
advocate selected by a defendant is not a member of the bar; 2) when the 
defendant wishes to be represented by an attorney he or she cannot afford; 3) 
when a defendant wishes to be represented by an attorney who declines to 
represent him or her; and 4) when the defendant wishes to be represented by an 
attorney who has a previous or ongoing relationship with an opposing party. 
Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159. 
 40. Steinly, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 20; Earl, WL 337554, ¶ 22. 
REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL OR ACCESS TO 
DEFENSE RESOURCES  
61 
been left to the states.41 In Ake, the Court specifically rejected the 
idea that an “indigent defendant has a constitutional right to 
choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to 
hire his own.”42 That being said, the fact that states are free to 
experiment with how they provide indigent defendants with 
defense resources does not mean that they can require an 
indigent defendant to waive their constitutional right to be 
represented by counsel of their own choosing to have access to 
additional defense resources. The freedom to experiment does not 
encompass the freedom to make defendants choose which of their 
constitutional rights to assert.  
The United States Supreme Court has stated that a statutory 
provision that has “no other purpose or effect than to chill the 
assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose 
to exercise them” is “patently unconstitutional.”43 Whatever goal 
a legislature might have, they cannot pursue that goal “by means 
that needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights.”44 
The Court has also held that “[t]o punish a person because he has 
done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process 
violation of the most basic sort.”45 The Court has called a 
situation where a defendant is forced to surrender one 
constitutional right to assert another has been called 
“intolerable.”46 
                                            
 41. State v. Steinly, No. 20120715, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 20 (Utah Jan. 27, 
2015); State v. Earl, No. 20120991, WL 337554, ¶ 22 (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 
470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985)). 
 42. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83. 
 43. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968). 
 44. Id. at 582. 
 45. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); see also North 
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 738 (1969) (Black, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 46. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1986)	   
 
Thus, in this case [the defendant] was obliged either to give up what 
he believed, with advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment 
claim or, in legal effect, to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. In these circumstances, we find it 
intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be 
surrendered in order to assert another. 
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C. The Right to Counsel of Choice is not Encompassed by the 
Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel 
The Supreme Court of Utah did not address the right to 
counsel of choice pursuant to the Sixth Amendment in Earl or 
Steinly. The court framed the constitutional question as “whether 
the defense available to indigents through the exclusive source of 
a public defense is adequate.”47 The court concluded that both 
defendants failed to demonstrate “that the panoply of resources 
provided by the public defense made available in Salt Lake 
County falls short of the fundamental requirement of ‘the basic 
tools of an adequate defense.’”48 But the United States Supreme 
Court has made it clear that when the right to be assisted by 
counsel of one’s choice is wrongly denied, the quality of the 
representation that a defendant receives is irrelevant.49 The 
Supreme Court of Utah confuses the right to counsel of choice 
with the right to effective counsel.  
While an indigent defendant may not have the right to an 
attorney of his or her own choosing,50 a defendant who can afford 
to hire counsel does have a Sixth Amendment right to choose who 
will represent him or her. The Supreme Court made it very clear 
in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez51 that the Sixth Amendment 
right to the assistance of counsel includes “the right of a 
defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who 
will represent him.”52 This right is distinct from the right to a fair 
trial.53 The Court held that the erroneous denial of a defendant’s 
                                            
 47. State v. Steinly, No. 20120715, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 21(Utah Jan. 27, 
2015); State v. Earl, No. 20120991, WL 337554, ¶ 23 (Utah Jan. 27, 2015). 
 48. Steinly, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 21; Earl, WL 337554, ¶ 23. 
 49. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006). 
 50. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 
(1989) (“[W]hatever the full extent of the Sixth Amendment’s protection of one’s 
right to retain counsel of his choosing, that protection does not go beyond the 
individual’s right to spend his own money to obtain the advice and assistance 
of . . . counsel.” (citing Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 
305, 370 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting))). 
 51. 548 U.S. 140 (2006). 
 52. Id. at 144. 
 53. Id. at 146 (“In sum, the right at stake here is the right to counsel of 
choice, not the right to a fair trial; and that right was violated because the 
deprivation of counsel [of the defendant’s choice] was erroneous.”).  
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right to his or her counsel of choice is a type of “structural error” 
which makes it “unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or 
prejudice inquiry to establish a Sixth Amendment violation.”54 
The Court distinguished between the “the right to counsel of 
choice—which is the right to a particular lawyer regardless of 
comparative effectiveness—and the right to effective counsel—
which imposes a baseline requirement of competence on whatever 
lawyer is chosen or appointed.”55   
D. The Single-Source Approach and the Right to Counsel of 
Choice 
The real constitutional question in Earl and Steinly is 
whether the IDA’s “single-source approach to indigent defense 
resources” violates the defendant’s right to counsel of choice 
under the Sixth Amendment. Based on existing United States 
Supreme Court precedent regarding the right to counsel of choice, 
Utah’s “single-source approach” seems to be unconstitutional. The 
Supreme Court of Utah reaches a different conclusion by ignoring 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and by incorrectly 
arguing that the right to additional defense resources derives 
from the Sixth Amendment rather from the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  
Finally, the Supreme Court of Utah’s argument that there “is 
no ground for establishing a new constitutional right to 
unbundled defense resources”56 shows that the court does not 
recognize the separate and distinct right to counsel, the right to 
counsel of one’s choice pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, or the 
right to the resources necessary for an adequate defense pursuant 
to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses. The defendants in Earl and Stanley were not 
asking for unbundled legal services but merely the right to retain 
counsel of their own choosing if they were financially able, and 
what they were constitutionally entitled to under Ake—“the raw 
                                            
 54. Id. at 148. 
 55. Id. 
 56. State v. Steinly, No. 20120715, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 21 (Utah Jan. 27, 
2015); State v. Earl, No. 20120991, WL 337554, ¶ 23 (Utah Jan. 27, 2015). 
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materials integral to the building of an effective defense.”57 It is 
the IDA that unconstitutionally bundles the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel of choice and the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of the basic tools of an adequate defense. 
IV. The Economic Inefficiency of the Single-Source Approach 
While the Supreme Court of Utah viewed the IDA’s single-
source approach as “rational” because the state had an interest in 
making sure that funds for indigent legal defense were not 
“abused or wasted” and that legal services were provided 
“effectively and efficiently,” there are alternative methods of 
providing indigent defense that would still satisfy those state 
interests without limiting the constitutional right to counsel of 
choice. Before the most recent amendments to the IDA, 
marginally indigent defendants who had retained counsel could 
petition the trial court for additional defense resources. The trial 
court was in a position to judge whether the additional defense 
resources requested were necessary to ensure an adequate 
defense so that funds for indigent defense were not “abused or 
wasted.”   
The inefficiency of the single-source approach calls into 
question its rationality. Conditioning access to additional defense 
resources on the dismissal of previously retained counsel is 
inefficient for two reasons. First, the time and effort that retained 
counsel spent on trial preparation must be duplicated by the 
newly appointed indigent defense provider, which delays the 
progress of the case.58 Second, marginally indigent defendants 
                                            
 57. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985). 
 58. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 
§ 5-6.2 (3d ed. 1992) (recommending that initially appointed counsel should 
represent the defendant throughout the trial court proceeding because, among 
other reasons, relying on a series of lawyers for representation is inefficient 
because each new attorney must begin by familiarizing himself or herself with 
the case and the client must be re-interviewed); Gary T. Lowenthal, Successive 
Representation by Criminal Lawyers, 93 YALE L.J. 1, 60–61 (1983) 
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must spend their limited resources retaining counsel that will 
subsequently not be permitted to represent them at trial.  
While the Supreme Court of Utah found this approach to be 
rational, it is only rational from an economic perspective if Utah 
relies on flat-fee contracts to provide indigent defense. If indigent 
defense providers were compensated based on the number of 
cases they handled or by the number of hours spent on a case, 
then requiring marginally indigent defendants to discharge 
privately retained counsel and accept representation by an 
indigent defense provider would increase the costs of providing 
indigent defense.  
The single-source approach makes even less sense when 
considering that Utah has a statute that authorizes recouping the 
costs of defending a marginally indigent defendant.59 A 
marginally indigent defendant who retains counsel can be forced 
to repay the state for the cost of any additional defense resources. 
The IDA gives the trial court the authority to “require a convicted 
defendant to pay costs.”60 These “costs” include “attorney fees of 
counsel assigned to represent the defendant, interpreter fees, and 
investigators’ fees.”61 Payment of costs can be made a condition of 
probation or suspension of sentence.62 
V. The Importance of the Selection of Counsel 
Defense counsel’s influence on the strategy pursued both in 
and out of court cannot be overstated.63 The Supreme Court has 
long recognized that a defendant in a criminal case “requires the 
                                                                                                     
expense for the defendant. Of course, if the defendant is indigent, the 
public must bear the additional financial burden created by a 
disqualification of defense counsel. 
 59. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32a-1 (2015); see also State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 
929, 937 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (“Costs, including reimbursement for legal 
defense fees, may be taxed to the defendant at the court’s discretion.”). 
 60. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32a-1 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 61. Id. § 77-32a-2. 
 62. Id. § 77-32a-6. 
 63. See, e.g., Kimberly Helene Zelnick, In Gideon’s Shadow: The Loss of 
Defendant Autonomy and the Growing Scope of Attorney Discretion, 30 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 363 (2003). 
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guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against 
him.”64 Because the defendant bears the consequences of a 
conviction, selecting counsel to assist in his or her defense is a 
highly personal choice. The selection of defense counsel has been 
described as “the most important decision a defendant makes in 
shaping his defense.”65 In deciding that the “erroneous 
deprivation of the right to counsel of choice” qualifies as 
“structural error,” the Supreme Court noted the profound effect 
that the selection of counsel will have on the outcome of a case: 
Different attorneys will pursue different strategies with 
regard to investigation and discovery, development of the 
theory of defense, selection of the jury, presentation of the 
witnesses, and the style of witness examination and jury 
argument. And the choice of attorney will affect whether and 
on what terms the defendant cooperates with the prosecution, 
plea bargains, or decides instead to go to trial. In light of these 
myriad aspects of representation, the erroneous denial of 
counsel bears directly on the framework within which the trial 
proceeds—or indeed on whether it proceeds at all.66 
The Court has also pointed out that the “language and spirit of 
the Sixth Amendment contemplates that counsel, like the other 
defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a 
willing defendant.”67 While certain decisions concerning the 
progress of a criminal case are reserved exclusively to the 
defendant, defense counsel has the power to decide on trial 
strategy and tactics, including which witnesses to call, whether 
and how to conduct cross-examination, which jurors to accept or 
strike, which trial motions should be made, and what evidence 
should be introduced.68 
                                            
 64. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932). 
 65. United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979); see also United 
States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1502 (10th Cir. 1988) (“A defendant’s right to 
choose an attorney is a corollary of the right to decide what type of defense the 
accused will present.”). 
 66. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (citations 
omitted). 
 67. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975). 
 68. Id. 
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VI. Utah’s Failing Indigent Defense System and the Effect of 
the Single-Source Approach 
Despite the Supreme Court of Utah’s suggestion that 
indigent defendants have access to a “panoply of resources,”69 
Utah’s indigent defense system is regarded as one of the worst in 
the nation. A report by the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association found that Utah ranked third to last of the fifty states 
in per capita spending on indigent defense, spending just $5.22 
per person, whereas the national average was $11.86.70 Because 
Utah shifts the burden of providing counsel to indigent 
defendants from the state to counties and municipalities, “a 
patchwork of models exists across the state.”71 Most counties in 
Utah “rely on contracts with private attorneys to represent 
indigent defendants” and “not all of these private attorneys are 
able to devote all of their time to contracted indigent clients.”72  
A. Flat-Fee Contracts for Providing Indigent Defense 
There are three models for the provision of indigent defense 
services: 1) a public defender office; 2) an assigned counsel 
program; and 3) contracts with private attorneys. The American 
Bar Association (ABA) does not endorse the use of contracts “as a 
viable, separate, ‘stand-alone’ component for the delivery of 
defense services.”73 The ABA has found that “the use of flat-fee 
contracts with competitive bidding by potential providers of 
services, based solely on a concern for the cheapest possible 
system” fails “to provide quality representation to the accused.”74 
                                            
 69. State v. Steinly, No. 20120715, 2015 WL 337633, ¶ 21 (Utah Jan. 27, 
2015); State v. Earl, No. 20120991, 2015 WL 337554, ¶ 23 (Utah Jan. 27, 2015). 
 70. NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, A RACE TO THE BOTTOM: SPEED 
AND SAVINGS OVER DUE PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS (June 2008), 
http://www.mynlada.org/michigan/michigan_report.pdf.  
 71. Marina Lowe, Indigent Defense in Utah: Constitutionally Adequate?, 22 
UTAH B. J. 22, 24 (2009). 
 72. Id.; see also FAILING GIDEON, SUPRA NOTE 1, at 3 (“Most Utah counties 
follow the contract counsel model.”). 
 73. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SUPRA NOTE 58, § 5-1.2. 
 74. Id. 
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Flat-fee contracts have been widely criticized as a method for 
providing indigent defense services because their primary goal is 
not quality representation, but instead, cost control.75 The 
Arizona Supreme Court even found that in one county, their use 
violated an indigent defendant’s right to counsel.76 
A recent report by the American Civil Liberties Union of 
Utah concluded that in each of the nine counties they studied, 
“the public defender system fails Gideon in almost every (if not 
every) respect.”77 The report found public defenders were 
“chronically underfunded and overworked, with some handling 
caseloads that, based on the contract fee, result in $400 (or less) 
per felony.”78 There was “little or no monies set aside in the public 
defense budgets for investigative, expert, or other resources 
necessary to build an adequate defense in many cases.”79 In many 
of the counties, the county attorney “has a hand in selecting 
which attorneys will be awarded the public defender contracts.”80 
None of the counties had “minimum qualifications or criteria to 
actually be a public defender.”81 The report characterized Utah’s 
county-by-county public defender system as a “failure” and 
pointed out that caseloads are so high that they render competent 
representation impossible and that there is a “systemic 
                                            
 75. Margaret H. Lemos, Civil Challenges to the Use of Low-Bid Contracts 
for Indigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1808, 1808 (2000)  
 
While overwhelming caseloads and inadequate funding plague 
indigent defense systems of all types, there is a growing consensus in 
the legal community that low-bid contract systems—under which the 
state or locality’s indigent defense work is assigned to the attorney 
willing to accept the lowest fee—pose particularly serious obstacles to 
effective representation;  
 
McMurtie, supra note 18, at 787 (noting that the ABA and NLADA have 
promulgated standards and guidelines for contracting defense services but “the 
trend has been to award contracts on the basis of cost alone, leading to an 
erosion of the constitutional principle of the right to counsel and the diminishing 
of lawyers’ professional responsibilities”). 
 76. State v. Smith, 681 P.2d. 1374 (Ariz. 1984). 
 77. FAILING GIDEON, supra note 1, at 7. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 8. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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deficiency” in providing the investigatory resources necessary for 
a complete defense.82 
B. The Choice Between Counsel and Defense Resources for the 
Marginally Indigent 
Marginally indigent defendants are not required to choose 
between two equally good indigent defense systems, one privately 
funded and one publicly funded. The choice that marginally 
indigent defendants face is to either retain an attorney that they 
believe has the ability to adequately defend them but forgo any 
additional defense resources, or to be represented by an indigent 
defense provider who struggles to find the time to adequately 
represent all of his or her clients but may have access to 
additional defense resources. Marginally indigent defendants in 
Utah may conclude that they are better off without additional 
defense resources if, to access them, an overwhelmed public 
defender must represent them. The IDA makes an indigent 
defense provider “an organ of the State interposed between an 
unwilling defendant” and his choice of counsel.83 
The IDA’s single-source approach is so extreme that it 
appears to deny indigent defendants the right to additional 
defense resources even if an attorney who did not receive 
compensation represented them. The Sixth Amendment 
guarantees defendants the right to be represented by either a 
qualified attorney that they can afford “or who is willing to 
represent the defendant even though he is without funds.”84 The 
single-source approach completely disregards a defendant’s right 
to counsel of choice, even when an attorney volunteers to 
represent a defendant pro bono, so that counties and 
municipalities in Utah can limit the costs associated with 
providing indigent defense through the use of flat-fee contracts. 
                                            
 82. Id. at 9–10. 
 83. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975). 
 84. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006) (citing 
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624–25 (1989)).  
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VII. Conclusion 
Defendants have the right to select an attorney who will be 
the architect of their defense, but they also have the right to “the 
raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense.”85 
Utah’s single-source approach to indigent defense ignores the fact 
that these are two separate and distinct constitutional rights and 
conditions defendants’ access to additional resource on a waiver 
of their right to counsel of their own choice. Now that the 
Supreme Court of Utah has decided that the IDA’s single-source 
approach is constitutional, marginally indigent defendants in 
Utah who wish to retain counsel, but also need additional defense 
resources to adequately prepare for trial, have no other option 
than to appeal to the Federal Courts. Whatever decision the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ultimately 
reaches, it is abundantly clear that the IDA’s single-source 
approach to indigent defense is yet another legislative effort to 
avoid adequately funding an indigent defense system that would 
seem to have “no other purpose or effect than to chill the 
assertion of constitutional rights.”86  
 
 
                                            
 85. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).   
 86. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968). 
